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I. Introduction 
An extensive experimental literature on coordination games explores the role of communication 
in allowing independent agents to efficiently coordinate their actions (for reviews, see Camerer 
(2003, Chapter 7) and Devetag & Ortmann (2007)). Particular attention has been devoted to 
games that involve a tradeoff between Pareto efficiency and greater payoff security (Van Huyck 
et al., 1990; Cooper et al., 1990). A prominent example is the following stag-hunt game that was 
studied by Cooper et al. (1992). 
Table 1: Stag Hunt Game 
  Column Player’s Action 
  1 2 
Row Player’s 
Action 
1 800, 800 800, 0 
2 0, 800 1000, 1000 
 
Cooper et al. (1992) found that without communication the risk-dominant equilibrium 
(Harsanyi and Selten, 1988), in which both players take action 1, tends to prevail. However, with 
universal mandatory cheap talk – in which players are required to send a pre-play message of “1” 
or “2” and the messages are (implicitly) costless – there is a tendency toward the Pareto-efficient 
equilibrium in which both players take action 2. This finding is consistent with numerous 
theoretical analyses of the role of cheap-talk pre-play messages in equilibrium selection (Farell, 
1988; Kim and Sobel, 1995; Farrell and Rabin, 1996; Blume, 1998; Demichelis and Weibull, 
2008) and with experimental evidence from other, related games (Charness, 2000; Blume and 
Ortmann, 2007). The stylized result from this literature is that inefficiency regularly obtains 
when players do not communicate, but that efficiency is greatly enhanced through the use of pre-
play messages.  
In this paper, we revisit pre-play communication in stag-hunt games, both experimentally 
and theoretically. In particular, we depart from Cooper et al. (1992) by making communication 
both optional and costly, and principally focus on the case with message costs in the range 𝑐 ∈ 
(0,200). We find that, with such optional costly communication, subjects generally opt not to 
send messages, but they nevertheless subsequently coordinate their actions efficiently with high 
frequency. This contrasts with the results obtained by Cooper et al. – which we also replicate in 
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separate treatments with costless and absent communication – that suggest efficient play in the 
stag-hunt game requires communication.  
In another treatment, with message costs, c > 200, we show that the beneficial effect of 
forgone messages for efficient coordination vanishes when message costs become 
“unreasonable.” That is, when message costs become high enough that message use is strictly 
dominated, players coordinate no better when choosing not to send messages than when 
messages were unavailable. 
Our experimental finding is potentially puzzling from a theoretical perspective. The stag-
hunt game with costly messages falls in the class of “money burning” games that were studied in 
an influential paper by Ben-Porath and Dekel (1992). They showed that as long as only one of 
the players has the option to send a costly message, playing the efficient action without sending a 
message is the unique outcome that survives iterated admissibility (IA). They also noted, 
however, that this no longer true if, as in our experiment, both players have the option to send a 
message.  
Our results can be understood in terms of Govindan and Wilson’s (2009) recent 
definition of forward induction (GW-FI). Applied to our game, GW-FI implements the following 
reasoning: Take a putative equilibrium in which messages are sent and the efficient action is 
taken and suppose the row player, Ann, unexpectedly observes that the column player, Bob, did 
not send a message. If Ann continues to believe that Bob is rational, she will reason that Bob 
expects at least as high a payoff as he would have received in equilibrium. This requires Bob to 
take action 2 and hence action 2 is optimal for Ann as well. If, however, Bob believes that Ann 
reasons in this manner, he strictly prefers to deviate from the putative equilibrium toward not 
sending a message and taking action 2. This breaks the original equilibrium. Analogous 
arguments can be used to eliminate all pure-strategy equilibrium outcomes, except the efficient 
one in which no messages are sent. 
The key to understanding the difference in conclusions from applying IA and GW-FI to 
our game is that GW-FI takes an equilibrium outcome as a starting point. This reference to a 
putative equilibrium point gives GW-FI extra leverage. Our experimental results suggest that this 
extra leverage adds explanatory power.   
When trying to explain experimental data with appeals to forward induction, we make 
strong demands on the experimental subjects’ ability to reason and therefore it might appear a 
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priori unlikely that forward induction would play a significant role in explaining initial behavior 
in experimental games. Indeed, unsurprisingly, not all our observations conform with the FI 
prediction. Importantly, however, consistent with the introspective character of GW-FI, the 
fraction of players who achieve efficiency in our games with reasonably costly optional 
messages is substantial from the first period on. Moreover, it is remarkably stable at that level 
and not significantly affected by learning. This is unlike behavior in control treatments, where 
messages are either unavailable or prohibitively costly and where the GW-FI prediction of 
efficiency does not hold. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents our theoretical 
analysis and hypotheses. In Section III we describe our experimental design and in Section IV 
we report our experimental data. Section V provides a discussion of our findings and relates our 
results to the literature. 
 
II. Theoretical Analysis and Hypotheses 
Our analysis and experiment modify the game in Table 1 in two ways.  
First, we introduce an initial stage in which both players simultaneously decide whether 
to send no message, or to send a message “1” or “2” to the other player. Both players then 
observe any message sent by the other player, before selecting an action in the second-stage 
coordination game.  
Second, we introduce a cost of sending a message, 𝑐 ≥ 0, which is not incurred when a 
player chooses to send no message. We refer to the special case when c = 0 as costless messages. 
The primary focus of our analysis and experiment deals with situations in which 𝑐 ∈ (0,200), 
meaning that pre-play communication is costly but can be supported as part of an equilibrium 
strategy. We refer to such a situation as one involving “reasonable” communication costs. We 
also consider the case where 𝑐 > 200 and therefore sending a message is possible but dominated 
– i.e., “unreasonable” message costs. Whether message costs are above or below 200 
significantly affects both our theoretical analysis and the experimental results. We begin by 
considering the case of reasonable message costs (𝑐 ∈ 0,200 ), which is the focus of our study, 
and return later to the cases with costless communication (c = 0) and unreasonable message costs 
(𝑐 > 200).  
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In our analysis, without loss of generality we will lump together strategies of a player that 
differ only at information sets ruled out by that player’s strategy; e.g. if a player’s strategy 
specifies sending a message, we will not explicitly keep track of that player’s continuation play 
in the event that he does not send a messages. All the strategies that we group together are 
outcome equivalent and indistinguishable by opponents and outside observers. The only effect of 
carrying the distinction along would be to increase notational burden. In our game with two 
costly messages, the option of not sending a message, and two choices at the action stage, each 
player has 3×2! strategies before and 24 strategies after grouping together outcome-equivalent 
strategies. 
Before applying Govindan and Wilson’s forward induction (GW-FI) test to our game, we 
briefly recall the limited power of Iterative Admissibility (IA), Extensive Form Rationalizability 
(EFR), and Fully Permissible Sets (FPS) when two players have the option to burn money. To 
keep this part of the analysis tractable we conduct it for the one-message game where each player 
has exactly one costly message; later, when we return to applying GW-FI, we do so for the two-
message game where each player has two costly messages as in our experiment. In the one-
message game, a player who uses strategy Mij sends a message, takes action i if he receives a 
message and takes action j if he does not receive a message. Similarly Nij stands for the strategy 
of not sending a message, responding to a message with action i and taking action j if no 
message is received. For convenience, Table 2 reports the payoffs from all resulting 
combinations of these strategies. 
Table 2: Communication Game with One Costly Message 
 M22 M21 M12 M11 N22 N21 N12 N11 
M22 
1000-c, 
1000-c 
1000-c, 
1000-c 
-c, 
800-c 
-c, 
800-c 
1000-c, 
1000 
1000-c, 
1000 
-c, 
800 
-c, 
800 
M21 
1000-c, 
1000-c 
1000-c, 
1000-c 
-c, 
800-c 
-c, 
800-c 
800-c, 
0 
800-c, 
0 
800-c, 
800 
800-c, 
800 
M12 
800-c, 
-c 
800-c, 
-c 
800-c, 
800-c 
800-c, 
800-c 
1000-c, 
1000 
1000-c, 
1000 
-c, 
800 
-c, 
800 
M11 
800-c, 
-c 
800-c, 
-c 
800-c, 
800-c 
800-c, 
800-c 
800-c, 
0 
800-c, 
0 
800-c, 
800 
800-c, 
800 
N22 
1000, 
1000-c 
   0, 
800-c 
1000, 
1000-c 
0, 
800-c 
1000, 
1000 
   0, 
800 
1000, 
1000 
0, 
800 
N21 
1000, 
1000-c 
   0, 
800-c 
1000, 
1000-c 
0, 
800-c 
 800, 
0 
 800, 
800 
800, 
0 
800, 
800 
N12 
   800, 
-c 
  800, 
800-c 
  800, 
-c 
  800, 
800-c 
1000, 
1000 
0, 
800 
1000, 
1000 
0, 
800 
N11 
   800, 
-c 
  800, 
800-c 
  800, 
-c 
  800, 
800-c 
800, 
0 
800, 
800 
800, 
0 
800, 
800 
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Informally, players in a game use forward induction when they seek to predict another 
player’s future behavior by rationalizing his past actions. There are two strands in the literature 
that formalize this idea, one that references putative equilibrium outcomes and one that does not.  
The non-equilibrium literature on forward induction starts with Pearce’s (1984) introduction of 
the extensive-form rationalizability condition (EFR). The key idea is that a player will not use a 
strategy that fails to be a best response to all beliefs at an information set reached by that 
strategy. Strategies that do not pass this test are eliminated and the test is repeated on the reduced 
set of strategies until the process converges (to the EFR set). 
EFR has forward induction implications because, at a given information set, it restricts 
the beliefs of the player moving there about strategies of others in accordance with their 
rationality.1 The conditions on players’ rationality and beliefs that give rise to EFR and related 
notions of iterated dominance have been clarified by the epistemic game theory literature. In 
particular, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) show that EFR corresponds to rationality and 
common strong belief in rationality on complete type spaces. A similar characterization is 
available for iterative admissibility (IA), where in each round all weakly dominated strategies of 
all players are deleted; m+1 rounds of iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies 
corresponds to rationality and m-th order assumption of rationality with complete type structures 
(Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler, 2008). Finally, Asheim & Dufwenberg (2003) propose 
their notion of fully permissible sets (FPS), which in general neither implies nor is implied by IA 
or EFR, despite underlying assumptions that rule out weakly dominated strategies. 
EFR, IA, and FPS come to the same conclusion for the one-message game. All three rule 
out the strictly dominated strategy M11 of sending a costly signal and then unconditionally 
playing action 1, and no more. Ben-Porath and Dekel (1992) already noted this coarseness of the 
IA prediction in money-burning games where more than one player has the option to burn 
money. For the sake of completeness we include proofs of all three claims for our game. 
 
                                                
1 A classical example of the power of this idea is its application to the battle of the sexes with an outside option: 
Player 1 has the choice between an outside option with a common payoff of 2 and entering a “battle of the sexes” 
with payoff pairs (3,1) and (1,3) at the two pure-strategy equilibria and (0,0) otherwise. Player 1’s strategy of opting 
in and then playing for (1,3) is strictly dominated. Hence, if Player 2 is called upon to move he must believe Player 1 
aims for (3,1). Given those restricted beliefs the strategy that might have given Player 2 a payoff of 3 is no longer a 
best reply and it is uniquely optimal for him to play according to the (3,1) equilibrium in the continuation game. As 
a result, Player 1 opts in and the forward-induction equilibrium payoff pair is (3,1). 
6 
 
Claim. In the game where both players have a single costly message, with the exception of the 
strategy of sending a message and then taking action 1 unconditionally (M11), all pure 
strategies belong to the set of iteratively admissible (IA) strategies.  
 
Proof: We will check one by one that none of the remaining pure strategies are (weakly) 
dominated by either a pure or a mixed strategy, both before and after the strictly dominated 
strategy M11 is eliminated. Since the arguments for both cases are exactly the same, we will not 
explicitly distinguish them. 
For N11 to be dominated, it has to be dominated by N21, the only other best reply against N11. 
But N21 does strictly worse against M21.  
For N12 to be dominated, it has to be dominated by N22, the only other best reply against N22. 
But N22 does strictly worse against M21.  
For N21 to be dominated, it has to be dominated by N22, the only other best reply against M12. 
But N22 does strictly worse against N21. 
For N22 to be dominated, it has to be dominated by N21, the only other best reply against M22. 
But N21 does strictly worse against N22. 
For M12 to be dominated, it has to be dominated by M22, the only other best reply against N21. 
But M22 does strictly worse against M12. 
For M21 to be dominated, it has to be dominated by M22, the only other best reply against M21. 
But M22 does strictly worse against N12. 
For M22 to be dominated, it has to be dominated by M21, the only other best reply against M21. 
But M21 does strictly worse against N22.        QED 
 
Claim. In the game where both players have a single costly message, with the exception of the 
strategy of sending a message and then taking action 1 unconditionally (M11), all pure 
strategies belong to the set of extensive-form rationalizable (EFR) strategies. 
 
Proof: It suffices to construct for each pure strategy S that remains after M11 is removed and for 
every information set that is not ruled out by S a conjecture whose support does not include M11 
and for which the strategy S is a best reply at that information set. Note that at an information set 
that is reached given the initial conjecture, the conjecture has to remain unchanged. We will use 
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only conjectures that assign probability one to a pure strategy. It then suffices for every strategy 
S to specify an initial conjecture CS and a conjecture for the information set that is reached when 
CS is proved wrong. Denote this alternative conjecture by CA; if, for example, a player initially 
conjectures that the other will send a message, he will need an alternative conjecture for the 
event that he does not receive a message. Accordingly we will list for each strategy S a triple (S; 
CS, CA). One checks immediately that in the following list of such triples the strategy S is a best 
reply at the appropriate information sets: (M22; M21, N21), (M21; M21, N12),(M12; N21, 
M12), (N22; N22, M22), (N21; M12, N11), (N12; N12, M21), (N11; N11, M21).  QED 
 
Claim. In the game where both players have a single costly message, with the exception of the 
strategy of sending a message and then taking action 1 unconditionally (M11), all pure 
strategies belong to a fully permissible set. 
  
Proof: We will not reproduce Asheim & Dufwenberg’s (2003) definitions here. Suffice it to note 
that (as easily inferred via their paper) if we can find for each player a non-empty subset of 
strategies such that no contained strategy is weakly dominated given that the opponents are 
restricted to choose from their subsets, then each player’s subset is fully permissible. Applied to 
Table 2, we infer that for either player {M22, M21, M12, N22, N21, N12, N11} is fully 
permissible (as seen if we pick that subset for each player). The veracity of the claim is implied. 
QED 
 
Note that, in particular, EFR (IA, FPS) does not rule out the outcome where no messages 
are sent and both take action 1. This is because sending a costly message and then playing action 
1 is rational if it was done in the hope that the other player would also send a message but that 
message is not forthcoming. Therefore a player who observes the other player sending a message 
may nevertheless rationally believe that that player will take action 1. When both players have 
the option of sending a message, messages can be viewed as conditional statements. Sending a 
message may then be an offer of conditional cooperation: “I will take action 2 provided you send 
a message as well.” In contrast, as we will see, with an approach that emphasizes the role of a 
putative equilibrium outcome, a player who sends an off-equilibrium-path message has no 
expectation of the other player sending a message as well. Since the other player’s actions are 
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pinned down by the equilibrium, his messages are unconditional and can be interpreted using 
equilibrium dominance: The deviating player expects at least as much from his deviation as from 
the reference equilibrium. 
This equilibrium refinement approach to forward induction dates back to Kohlberg and 
Mertens (KM) (1986). They coined the term and in their Proposition 6 associated it with the 
property of stable sets of equilibria containing stable sets of games obtained by removing 
strategies that are not best replies to any of the equilibria in the set. KM did not formally define 
forward induction. For this reason and for its ease of applicability we use Govindan and Wilson’s 
(2009) closely related definition (hereafter referred to as GW-FI). 
We apply GW-FI to the two-message game that we used in our experiment. Recall that 
we do not distinguish a player’s strategies that differ only in behavior at information sets that are 
precluded by those strategies. Then, a strategy µijk with 𝜇 ∈ {𝑀!,𝑀!,𝑁} and 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑘   ∈ {1,2} 
specifies the choice of message (or none) µ, the response 𝑖 to message 𝑀!, the response 𝑗 to 
message 𝑀! and the response 𝑘 to no message, 𝑁. The key to both the KM notion and the GW 
definition of FI is an equilibrium dominance argument: Players should assign probability zero to 
strategies of their opponents that result in a lower payoff than from the equilibrium in question. 
We will find that among all pure-strategy equilibrium outcomes only one survives Govindan and 
Wilson’s forward induction condition. Specifically, GW-FI rejects the equilibrium outcome 𝑵𝑵-
1 in which neither player sends a message and both take action 1, the equilibrium outcomes 𝑴𝒓𝑴𝒔-2 with 𝑟, 𝑠 = 1,2 in which players send message 𝑴𝒓 and 𝑴𝒔, respectively, and take 
action 2 and the equilibrium outcomes 𝑵𝑴𝒔-2 and 𝑴𝒔𝑵-2, s=1,2, in which exactly one player 
sends a message and then both players take action 2. GW-FI does not reject the equilibrium 
outcome 𝑵𝑵-2 in which players send no message and take action 2. 
The GW-FI conclusions can be understood informally via the following “forward-
induction reasoning”: For the sake of concreteness let the game be played between Ann and Bob. 
Consider the putative equilibrium outcome 𝑵𝑵-1 and suppose that Ann (unexpectedly) observes 
a message 𝑀! from Bob. If she maintains her belief in Bob’s rationality, she must reason that 
Bob expects at least the payoff from the putative equilibrium 𝐍𝐍-1. This, however, is impossible 
with costly messages unless Bob plans to take action 2. Thus, following Bob’s message 2, Ann 
must believe that Bob will take action 2. Given those beliefs, Bob strictly prefers to deviate from 𝑵𝑵-1. Similarly, consider the putative equilibrium outcome 𝑴𝒓𝑴𝒔-2 and suppose that Ann 
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(unexpectedly) observes no message from Bob. If this move by Bob is rational, then Bob must 
expect to get a payoff from this move that is at least as high as his payoff under the equilibrium 
outcome 𝑴𝒓𝑴𝒔-2. This, however, requires that Bob take action 2 in the continuation game. 
Given this belief on Ann’s part, Bob strictly prefers to deviate from 𝑴𝒓𝑴𝒔-2. The argument for 
the equilibrium outcomes 𝑵𝑴𝒔-2 and 𝑴𝒔𝑵-2, s=1,2, is essentially the same as for 𝑴𝒓𝑴𝒔-2. 
Finally, the equilibrium outcome 𝑵𝑵-2 survives the GW-FI test since every deviation that 
changes this equilibrium outcome strictly lowers the deviating player’s payoff. Thus among the 
pure-strategy equilibrium outcomes, only the one where players forgo messages and play 
efficiently survives. 
Govindan and Wilson (2009) define forward induction in terms of Reny’s (1992) “weak 
sequential equilibrium.” Weak sequential equilibrium coincides with Kreps and Wilson’s (1982) 
sequential equilibrium, except that a player’s strategy need not prescribe best replies at 
information sets that are ruled out by that strategy. GW use a variant of weak sequential 
equilibrium in which beliefs at an information set are distributions over other players’ strategies 
rather than over nodes in that information set.  
Recall that an equilibrium outcome in a game is the distribution over terminal nodes 
induced by the strategies that support that equilibrium. The key concept in GW’s definition of FI 
is that of a relevant strategy: A pure strategy is relevant for the outcome of a game if there exists 
a weakly sequential equilibrium with that outcome such that the strategy is a best reply to 
equilibrium beliefs at every information set not excluded by that strategy. An information set is 
relevant for an outcome provided that not every combination of strategies relevant for that 
outcome precludes it. The forward induction requirement then asks that at relevant information 
sets beliefs be concentrated on relevant strategies. 
 
Definition. (Govindan and Wilson, 2009) An outcome satisfies forward induction if it results 
from a weakly sequential equilibrium in which at every information set that is relevant for that 
outcome the support of the belief of the player acting there is confined to profiles of Nature’s 
strategies and other players’ strategies that are relevant for that outcome. 
 
The following result classifies all pure-strategy equilibrium outcomes in the two-message game 
according whether or not they satisfy forward induction. 
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Claim. In the game where each player has the option to either send no message, 𝑵, or one of two 
costly messages, 𝑴𝟏 and 𝑴𝟐, (1) the equilibrium outcome 𝑵𝑵-1 in which players send no 
message and take action 1 fails to satisfy forward induction; (2) the equilibrium outcomes 𝑴𝒓𝑴𝒔-2 with 𝑟, 𝑠 = 1,2 in which players send message 𝑴𝒓 and 𝑴𝒔 respectively and take action 
2 fail to satisfy forward induction; (3) the equilibrium outcomes 𝑵𝑴𝒔-2 and 𝑴𝒔𝑵-2, s=1,2, in 
which exactly one player sends a message and both take action 2 fail to satisfy forward 
induction; and, (4) the equilibrium outcome  𝑵𝑵-2 in which players send no message and take 
action 2 satisfies forward induction. 
 
Proof: (1) The 𝑵𝑵-1 outcome is supported by the set of mixtures of strategies Nij1, i,j=1,2, that 
assign probabilities 𝑝!"#!  to those strategies that satisfy 𝑝!!"" + 𝑝!!!" ≤ 800+ 𝑐1000    , and                          (1) 𝑝!!"! + 𝑝!!!" ≤ 800+ 𝑐1000   .                                          (2) 
The set of strategies that is relevant for this outcome is {𝑁𝑖𝑗1,𝑀!𝑖𝑗2,𝑀!𝑖𝑗2}!,!!!,!. Hence, at the 
(relevant) information set of player 1 where player 1 unexpectedly observes player 2 having sent 
message 𝑀!, GW-FI requires us to restrict player 1’s beliefs over player 2’s strategies to the set {𝑀!𝑖𝑗2}!,!!!,!. Against such beliefs neither N111 nor N211 are best replies. Therefore all best 
replies of player 1 that satisfy the GW-FI belief restriction violate condition (2). 
 (2) The 𝑴𝟏𝑴𝟐-2 outcome (which we examine representatively for all 𝑴𝒓𝑴𝒔-2 
equilibrium outcomes) is supported by mixtures over player 1’s strategies 𝑀!𝑖2𝑘,with  𝑖, 𝑘 = 1,2 
that satisfy  𝑝!!!"" + 𝑝!!!!! ≤ 1000− 𝑐1000                             (3) 
and by mixtures over player 2’s strategies 𝑀!2𝑗𝑘,with  𝑗, 𝑘 = 1,2 that satisfy  𝑝!!!"! + 𝑝!!!!! ≤ 1000− 𝑐1000   .                          (4) 
The set of player 2’s strategies that is relevant for this outcome is {𝑁2𝑗𝑘,𝑀!2𝑗𝑘,𝑀!2𝑗𝑘}!,!!!,!. 
Hence, at the (relevant) information set of player 1 where player 1 unexpectedly observes player 
2 not having sent a message, GW-FI requires us to restrict player 1’s beliefs over player 2’s 
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strategies to the set {𝑁2𝑗𝑘}!,!!!,!. Any mixture over player 1’s strategies 𝑀!𝑖2𝑘,with  𝑖, 𝑘 = 1,2, 
that is a best reply to such beliefs must satisfy 𝑝!!!"! = 𝑝!!!!" = 0 and therefore 𝑝!!!"" +𝑝!!!!! = 1, in violation of condition (3). 
 (3) The 𝑵𝑴𝟐-2 outcome (which we examine representatively for all 𝑵𝑴𝒔-2 and 𝑴𝒔𝑵-2 
equilibrium outcomes, s=1,2) is supported by arbitrary mixtures of player 2 over strategies in the 
set {𝑀!𝑖𝑗2}!,!!!,! and by mixtures of player 1 over strategies in the set {𝑁𝑖2𝑘}!,!!!,! that satisfy 
the condition 𝑝!!"" + 𝑝!!!! ≤ 1000− 𝑐1000     .                            (5) 
The set of strategies of player 2 that is relevant for this outcome is {𝑁𝑖𝑗2,𝑀!𝑖𝑗2,𝑀!𝑖𝑗2}!,!!!,!. 
Consider the relevant information set of player 1 who has followed his equilibrium strategy, not 
sent a message and who has observed a deviation by player 2 to not sending a message. GW-FI 
requires us to restrict the support of player 1’s beliefs at this information set to the set of 
strategies {𝑁𝑖𝑗2}!,!!!,!. Against such beliefs, however, no strategy of player 1 that assigns 
positive probability to any of the strategies in the set {𝑁𝑖21}!,!!!,! is a best reply. Any mixture 
over player 1’s strategies 𝑁𝑖2𝑘,with  𝑖, 𝑘 = 1,2, that is a best reply to such beliefs must satisfy 𝑝!!"! = 𝑝!!!" = 0 and therefore 𝑝!!"" + 𝑝!!!! = 1, in violation of condition (5). 
(4) The equilibrium outcome 𝑵𝑵-2 is supported by arbitrary mixtures over strategies in 
the set {𝑁𝑖𝑗2}!,!!!,!. These strategies are also the relevant strategies. Hence the only relevant 
information sets for this outcome are the ones where neither player has sent a message. Since 
they are on the equilibrium path, the belief restriction has no bite.  QED 
 
Based on these theoretical considerations, we predict that in our experiment, with the 
option to send reasonably costly messages (𝑐 ∈ (0,200)), the modal behavior will be for 
players not to send messages and to take action 2 (Hypothesis 1). Given that Cooper et al. 
(1992) and others found coordination difficult to achieve without pre-play messages, this 
theoretical hypothesis is of special interest. Note that it is of further interest, as it is the unique 
equilibrium outcome selected by one class of approaches to forward induction. 
Further support for this prediction comes from the fact that, as shown by Hurkens (1996), 
it is the unique outcome that is supported by equilibria belonging to a minimal curb (closed 
under rational behavior) set (Basu and Weibull, 1991). Curb sets are sets of strategies that are 
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closed under inclusion of best replies and minimal curb sets do not strictly contain another such 
set. In the case of a unique minimal curb set, as in our game, a player who reasons through the 
game in terms of iterating best replies will eventually find himself caught in the unique minimal 
curb set, regardless of his starting point. Each curb set contains a persistent retract (Kalai and 
Samet, 1984) and each persistent retract contains a strategically stable set of equilibria, which 
then satisfies the forward property articulated in Proposition 6 of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).2 
Our prime motivation for introducing curb sets is, however, that they help us offer a 
unified treatment of the burning-money (𝑐 ∈ (0,200)) and cheap-talk variants (c = 0) of our 
game. Blume (1998) shows that, with multi-sided pre-play communication, if the underlying 
game has a unique efficient action profile, then under a mild behavioral assumption (that 
agreement on an equilibrium action profile confers an infinitesimal payoff boost to that profile) 
every strategy profile in the unique minimal curb retract is an efficient equilibrium in which each 
player sends message 2. Based on this, we predict that in our experiment, with the option to 
send costless messages (c = 0), the modal behavior will be for players to send message “2” and 
to take action 2 (Hypothesis 2). That is, we expect to replicate the findings of Cooper et al. 
(1992) in this environment. At the same time, under the same behavioral assumption we also 
recover our prediction for the burning-money game of efficient play without messages 
(Hypothesis 1). 
We next consider the case with unreasonably costly messages (𝑐 > 200). Here, the above 
forward induction intuition and analysis fail to select the efficient outcome because 1000-c < 
800, which means that sending a message, regardless of the outcome in the second-stage 
subgame, is strictly dominated by not sending a message and selecting action 1. Thus, to return 
to our earlier example, the absence of a message from Bob tells Ann nothing about what Bob 
intends to do, as he would never send a message. The elimination of all strategies that employ 
messages reduces the game to the game in Table 1. Prior research, e.g., Cooper et al. (1992), 
indicates that behavior in this game will converge to the inefficient (1,1) equilibrium. Therefore, 
                                                
2 Our game has mixed strategy equilibrium outcomes in which all message options, sending no message, sending 
message 1 and sending message 2, have strictly positive probability. For example, there is an equilibrium in which 
both players mix over their strategies 𝑁111,𝑀!221,𝑀!221 with probabilities !""!!!"" , !!""  and !!""  respectively. 
While these outcomes pass the Govindan-Wilson test, persistence and the minimal curb condition suggest that these 
outcomes are fragile. 
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we predict that in our experiment, with unreasonably costly messages (𝑐 > 200)), the modal 
behavior will be for players not to send messages and to take action 1 (Hypothesis 3).  
We make the same prediction for the treatment in which messages are not possible, and 
message costs are therefore implicitly infinite. That is, we predict that in our experiment, with 
no messages, the modal behavior will be for players to take action 1 (Hypothesis 4). As with 
Hypothesis 2, this essentially predicts a replication of Cooper et al. (1992). 
With these hypotheses in mind, we proceed to our experimental test. 
 
III. Experimental Design  
The experiment is modeled after Cooper et al. (1992), in which subjects played the game in 
Table 1 either with or without communication.3 The experiment was conducted at the University 
of Pittsburgh’s Experimental Economics Laboratory (PEEL). Each session in our study consisted 
of ten different subjects, recruited by email from Carnegie Mellon University, the University of 
Pittsburgh and the surrounding community.  
 At the beginning of a session, players sat at separate computers and read instructions on 
the screen as they were read aloud by the experimenter.4 Before playing the game, every 
participant completed a quiz to verify understanding of payoffs, communication rules, and the 
matching procedure. The experimenter answered questions privately. 
 
Experimental Conditions 
 The five conditions are summarized in Table 3, which also presents the relevant cost 
parameter, c, for each condition. We also include our theoretical predictions. 
We conducted a no communication baseline (No Messages) in which subjects played the 
game repeatedly with re-matching after every period. In this treatment, participants played the 
one-shot stag hunt game in Table 1 for forty periods. The payoffs in Table 1 corresponded to 
                                                
3 Other than the treatment differences, our design choices generally follow those of Cooper et al., with the exception 
that we simplified the procedure where possible and also modified the design to collect more data. For example, 
instead of using 11 subjects with one excluded each period, we used 10 subjects. Instead of 11 practice rounds of a 
dominant strategy game followed by 22 real rounds, we included no practice rounds and 40 real rounds. Instead of 
each subject being matched with every other subject exactly twice (in random order), we used random matching. 
And finally, instead of a payoff procedure that involved a lottery, we converted all earnings in ECU directly into 
U.S. dollars (with an exchange rate that kept the numerical payoffs in the stage game consistent with Cooper et al.). 
4 The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Instructions for one 
treatment (with 𝑐 = 10) are provided in the Appendix. 
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“Experimental Currency Units” (ECU), and were converted to dollars at the end of the 
experiment at the known exchange rate of $1 per 2500 ECU. Each period, participants were 
anonymously and randomly re-matched, played the one-shot game, and saw the results of that 
period. In every period after the first, players saw the history of their own prior plays of the game 
(own choice, opponent’s choice and resulting outcome), but did not know the identity or history 
of their current opponent. 
Our four conditions with messages depart from Cooper et al.’s design in two main ways, 
consistent with our analysis in Section II.  
First, we allowed subjects to choose whether to send a message. Therefore, in a Costless 
Messages condition subjects chose at the beginning of each period whether to send a costless 
message to their opponent. Payoffs were not directly affected by this choice. Subjects selected 
either N (“no message”), M1 (“1”), or M2 (“2”), by clicking on one of the three options on a 
screen. After every subject made this choice, and corresponding opponents were informed of the 
message choice, subjects proceeded to play the game in Table 1. While this treatment differs 
slightly from Cooper et al.’s two-way communication treatment, in which messages were 
costless but subjects were required to send messages, we expect the two treatments to be quite 
similar in that there is little reason for subjects in our Costless Messages condition not to send 
messages. This prediction is also consistent with our Hypothesis 2. 
Our second modification is more important. We include three conditions in which 
messages are costly, meaning that a player’s payoff from Table 1 was decreased by a cost, c, if 
that player chose to send a message to her opponent. There was no cost if a player chose not to 
send a message, and subjects always observed, at no cost, any message from the opponent. 
Subjects made their choices in exactly the same manner as in the Costless Messages condition, 
except that now the cost of sending a message, in ECU, was presented next to the possible 
message choices “1” and “2”, while the “no message” option explicitly indicated no cost.  
Our three costly communication conditions varied the cost associated with sending a 
message. In two conditions with Reasonably Costly messages (𝒄 ∈ (𝟎,𝟐𝟎𝟎)), RC-10 and RC-
100, sending a message cost 10 and 100 ECU, respectively. In a condition with Unreasonably 
Costly messages (c > 200), UC-300, sending a message cost 300 ECU. Our analysis predicts 
different behavior for the two kinds of message costs, as presented in Table 3. 
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IV. Results  
We conducted three sessions each of the Costless Messages and No Messages conditions, seven 
sessions each of the two conditions with Reasonably Costly messages, RC-10 and RC-100, and 
five sessions of the condition with Unreasonably Costly messages (UC-300), using a total of 250 
subjects. In our analysis, we explore several different characteristics of the results, including the 
sending of messages, aggregate action choices and outcomes, individual behavior, and earnings. 
 
A. Message Use 
The first question we ask is how message costs affected the frequency of message use. 
Recall that our analysis predicted that message “2” would be very frequent with Costless 
Messages but less frequent in the three conditions with Costly Messages (see Table 3).  
 We find that message costs strongly affect message use. Under Costless Messages, 
message “2” was sent 89.3 percent of the time. However, with message costs, far fewer messages 
were sent: the frequency of message “2” was 24.4 percent for c = 10, 11.3 percent for c = 100, 
and 4.8 percent for c = 300.5 Thus, the data generally support our predictions concerning 
message use – message “2” is used very frequently with Costless Messages, but rarely in all 
conditions with Costly Messages. 
 Table 4 reports probit regressions, with subject random effects, using the choice to send 
message “2” as the dependent variable. The regressions use only data from the four treatments in 
which messages were possible. As model 1 reveals, the frequency of message use is significantly 
lower in all Costly Message conditions, relative to the condition with Costless Messages.6 Thus, 
message costs – even very small ones as in RC-10 – significantly decrease message use.7  
 To explore possible heterogeneity in message use across subjects, Figure 1 shows the 
distributions of message frequency by subject in each of the four conditions with 
                                                
5 As expected, message “1” was sent very rarely (never more than 1.2 percent of the time in any condition). In a 
large majority of these cases (86 percent), subjects followed a message of “1” by playing action 1, and no subject 
sent message “1” and subsequently chose action 2 more than one time in the forty periods.  
6 In a more conservative statistical test, we calculate the frequency of message “2” use in a session and use this 
session-level statistic as the unit of observation in a non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test of differences across 
conditions. The difference in frequency of message “2” use between the Costless Message condition and either RC-
10, RC-100, or UC-300 is statistically significant (respectively, z = 2.39, p < 0.02; z = 2.39, p < 0.02; and z = 2.24, p 
< 0.03). Among the conditions with Costly Messages, only the difference between RC-10 and UC-300 is statistically 
significant (z = 2.36, p < 0.02).  
7 The coefficients for the three Costly Message conditions in model 1 differ significantly and are ordered such that 
fewer messages are used as costs increase. While our predictions do not account for any differences between the 
three treatments with costly messages, it is not entirely surprising to find fewer messages with higher costs. 
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communication. Each graph shows, for a particular condition, how often a subject sent message 
“2”, represented on the horizontal axis, ranging from never (0) to doing so in every period (1). 
The vertical axis presents the frequency of each particular message use profile among subjects in 
that condition. When messages were Costless, a large majority of subjects sent message “2” in 
every period.8 However, in the three Costly message conditions, the modal behavior was to send 
no messages at any point in the experiment.  
 While we find, as predicted, that subjects used messages far less frequently in the Costly 
Message conditions, there exists a possibility that this difference surfaced over the course of the 
experiment, and that subjects in all conditions initially sent messages with high frequency, but 
stopped doing so in the Costly conditions. The data reject this interpretation. As model 2 in Table 
4 reveals, there is no significant trend in message “2” use across periods in any condition, while 
model 3 reveals that message use was significantly lower under costly messages when 
considering only the first period. Additionally, the frequency of message “2” is never much 
higher in any period of the Costly message conditions than the corresponding aggregate 
frequencies above – the highest frequencies of message “2” use in any period are 34.2 percent in 
RC-10, 17.1 percent in RC-100, and 12 percent in UC-300 – and this frequency is never lower 
than 83.3 percent in any period of the Costless Messages condition.  
 The message use by subjects in the experiment therefore strongly confirms the first part 
of our predictions in Table 3. Whether on aggregate, by individual subject, or across periods, 
costless messages are used with very high frequency, while costly messages are used rarely. 
 
B. Actions in the Stag Hung Game 
We now consider the second part of the predictions in Table 3, that the modal behavior in 
the post-message subgame should be action 2 when messages are Costless or Reasonably Costly 
(RC-10 and RC-100) and action 1 when messages are either Unreasonably Costly (UC-300) or 
there are No Messages. Figure 2 presents the frequency of action 2 choices across periods, 
separately for each treatment.  
 Under No Messages and Costless Messages, we expected to replicate the findings in 
                                                
8 Three subjects in Costless Messages rarely or never sent message “2” even though doing so was costless. One of 
these subjects had poor vision and experienced difficulty reading the screen and clicking on the radio buttons. The 
other two repeatedly played action 1, and sent the corresponding message, perhaps out of altruism (i.e., to ensure 
that their opponent did not receive the zero payoff).  
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Cooper et al. (1992), who found efficient coordination rare when pre-play communication was 
not possible but frequent under costless communication. This is also generally the case in our 
data. Action 2 was chosen only 42 percent of the time with No Messages, and only 30 percent of 
the time in the final ten periods.9 With Costless Messages, we predicted that a high frequency of 
message “2” would support a high frequency of action 2 choices. Having already observed a high 
frequency of “2” messages, the 87 percent of choices of action 2 further corroborates our 
prediction. Therefore, action choices generally support Hypotheses 2 and 4.  
 We next consider Reasonably Costly messages (𝑐 ∈ (0,200)). Despite the low frequency 
of message use in these conditions, we observe high frequencies of action 2 in both RC-10 (83 
percent) and RC-100 (76 percent), and these are similar to the frequency observed with Costless 
Messages (87 percent). In fact, by the final 10 periods action 2 was selected between 80 and 83 
percent of the time in all three of the conditions where we predicted a high frequency of that 
action, despite the very different frequencies of messages. Thus, combining the frequency of 
messages and action 2 choices in the treatments with Reasonably Costly messages, we find 
strong support for our main prediction (Hypothesis 1). The availability of optional, and 
reasonably costly, pre-play messages seems sufficient to obtain a high frequency of efficient 
coordination – subjects do not actually have to use the messages. 
 Finally, we consider the condition with Unreasonably Costly messages, UC-300, where 
we predicted the modal choice in the stag hunt game would be action 1 (Hypothesis 3). The data 
also confirm this prediction: action 2 is selected 28 percent of the time in this treatment, and this 
frequency converges downward over the course of the experiment. Thus, while message use was 
infrequent in all conditions with Costly messages, forgone messages only facilitated efficient 
coordination in the two conditions with Reasonably Costly messages, as we predicted. 
 Table 5 reports random-effects probit regressions that use as the dependent variable 
whether a subject chose action 2 in a period. The first model confirms our predictions regarding 
behavior across treatments: action 2 is chosen significantly more frequently with Costless or 
Reasonably Costly Messages, than with either No Messages (the omitted category) or 
                                                
9 There is some heterogeneity across sessions, particularly in the No Messages condition (see Figure 5). In two 
sessions, convergence to action 1 occurred as predicted, while in the remaining No Message session behavior 
converged to action 2. Therefore, coordination on the inefficient game equilibrium (1,1) is weaker than that 
observed by Cooper et al. (1992), though we find it to be the case in two of three sessions. Note that this discrepancy 
with Cooper et al.’s results works against finding support for our hypotheses. Some procedural differences between 
the two experiments may explain the disparity (see footnote 3). 
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Unreasonably Costly Messages. We fail to reject the restriction that the three coefficients for 
Costless Messages, RC-10, and RC-100 are equal (χ2(2) = 4.32, p = 0.12).  
 Model 2 includes time trends for each condition, and confirms some patterns from Figure 
2. For example, the frequency of action 2 decreases across periods both with No Messages and 
Unreasonably Costly Messages, and the decrease is larger with the latter. More importantly, in 
model 2 the intercepts and time trends differ for the three remaining conditions (Costless, RC-10 
and RC-100). While the difference between the coefficients for these three intercepts is 
statistically significant (χ2(2) < 15.50, p < 0.001), the differences in the frequencies of first-
period action 2 choice across these three conditions are small (Costless: 90 percent; RC-10: 79 
percent; RC-100: 80 percent) and none of the pairwise first-period comparisons at the subject 
level are statistically significant (χ2(1) < 1.83, p > 0.17, in all comparisons). To further explore 
differences in first period behavior, model 4 in Table 5 reports the same regression as model 1, 
but using only first period data. The coefficients for the three conditions in which we predicted a 
high frequency of action 2 choices – Costless Messages and the two conditions with Reasonably 
Costly messages – are positive and significant, jointly significantly different from zero (χ2(3) = 
11.64, p < 0.01), and do not differ statistically from each other (χ2(2) = 1.98, p = 0.37). 
 To summarize, our analysis so far strongly confirms all of our hypotheses. Confirming 
prior research, subjects who cannot send messages tend to select action 1 (Hypothesis 4), while 
costless messages facilitate action 2 (Hypothesis 2). However, messages appear unnecessary 
when they are Reasonably Costly (𝑐 ∈ (0,200)), as subjects in these conditions do not send 
messages, yet they select action 2 with frequencies very similar to those under Costless 
messages. This supports our main prediction (Hypothesis 1), based on the definition of forward 
induction in Govindan and Wilson (2009). Our claim that higher action 2 frequencies with 
forgone costly messages are due to the kind of reasoning underlying forward induction is further 
supported by the fact that, as message costs become unreasonable (c > 200), subjects send few 
messages but modal behavior changes dramatically toward action 1. Thus, the inference subjects’ 
draw from the reasonableness of a forgone message seems critical. All of this is supported both 
when considering data from all 40 periods or only the first period. 
 
C. Individual Actions Conditional on Messages 
 Our prior analysis confirms our hypotheses when looking, separately, at message and 
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choice behavior. To provide a stronger test, we also consider these two aspects of a player’s 
strategy jointly. At the root of our main prediction (Hypothesis 1) is that subjects in the 
conditions with Reasonably Costly messages select action 2 with high frequency when they do 
not receive a message from their opponent, but that subjects in the Unreasonably Costly and No 
Message conditions select action 1 in the absence of messages. 
 Figure 3 shows the frequency of action choices 2 (dark shading) and 1 (light shading) 
conditional on a message of “2” being sent or received in each condition.10 The label above each 
panel presents the message profile, (message sent, message received), indicating both the 
message sent by the subject and the message received from the opponent. The percentages over 
each bar indicate the frequency in that particular condition for that particular message profile. 
For example, the bottom right panel, labeled (2,2), presents instances in which both the focal 
player and her opponent sent message “2”, which occurred with a frequency of 80 percent under 
Costless Messages, 8 percent in RC-10, 2 percent in RC-100, and never occurred in UC-300 or, 
of course, under No Messages. In this panel, it is apparent that when a player both sent a 
message and also received a message from the opponent, the player chose 2, regardless of 
message cost (at least for c < 200).  
 Turning to the diagonal panels, in which a subject either sent no message but received 
one (none, 2) or sent a message but did not receive one (2, none), we find interesting differences 
between the communication treatments. In particular, with Costless Messages, such 
communication outcomes resulted in fewer than half of subjects playing action 2 subsequently.11 
However, in the conditions with Reasonably Costly messages (RC-10 and RC-100) the 
proportion of action 2 choices is much higher in both panels, and is close to one.  
 Most importantly for our purposes, consider the top-left panel, when no messages are 
sent. Under the complete absence of messages, subjects are more likely to choose action 2 when 
sending a message would have been Reasonably Costly (RC-10: 75.5%; RC-100: 71.8%) than 
when sending a message was Unreasonably Costly (22.5%) or simply not possible (42.4%).12 
                                                
10 In the few instances in which subjects sent a message of “1” they and their opponents usually subsequently chose 
action 1. This is consistent with subjects who decide to play action 1 in the game and exhibit other-regarding 
preferences toward their opponent. 
11 Note that the Costless Messages data in the (none, 2) panel is almost entirely composed of the three subjects with 
irregular message behavior (see footnote 8). The Costless Messages data in the (2, none) panel is composed almost 
entirely of responses to these subjects by their opponents. 
12 The frequency of action choice 2 under Costless Messages in the top-left (none, none) panel is not highly 
informative as this message profile occurred very infrequently. 
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Thus, as we hypothesized, the absence of messages results in different action responses based on 
whether sending a message would have been reasonable or possible.  
 To provide statistical evidence that the absence of messages is interpreted differently 
under Reasonably Costly messages than in other conditions, model 3 in Table 5 explores how 
behavior changes across conditions in response to receiving a message of “2” from an opponent. 
Since a subject’s own message is endogenous, we do not include own message as an explanatory 
variable. When including whether a message was received, the coefficient for the Costless 
Message condition becomes statistically insignificant, while the coefficient for Received 
Message “2,” which applies to this condition, becomes positive and statistically significant. This 
shows that simply being in the Costless Message condition does not increase the likelihood of an 
action 2 choice – when messages are costless it is also necessary that one’s opponent send a 
message of “2.” However, the coefficients for the two conditions with Reasonably Costly 
messages are positive and statistically significant, indicating that receiving messages is 
unnecessary in these conditions to see an increase in action 2 choice. That is, action 2 choices 
increase significantly from simply being in these conditions, regardless of whether a message of 
“2” is received. This is consistent with our primary hypothesis (H1), that the possibility of 
reasonably costly messages is sufficient to facilitate play consistent with the efficient 
equilibrium.13 
 Of course, the above analysis pools behavior across all periods and therefore may reflect 
cohort effects and path dependencies. Therefore, to conduct a conservative statistical test of this 
finding, in model 5 we examine behavior in the first period alone, looking at the frequency of 
action 2 choices only in cases where no messages were used by either player.14 The model 
confirms the above analysis – the absence of any messages yields at least marginally 
significantly more action 2 choices in both conditions with Reasonably Costly messages, relative 
to when messages are not possible, but no significant increase when messages are Unreasonably 
Costly. Thus, even from the first period, subjects who play the stag hunt game without either 
receiving a message from or sending one to an opponent behave differently depending on what 
                                                
13 The negative coefficients on the interaction between the costly message conditions and Message “2” indicate that 
the effect of receiving a message is weaker under costly messages than under costless messages. 
14 This occurred 40 percent of the time in RC-10, 63 percent in RC-100, 92 percent in UC-300, and (by 
construction) 100 percent of the time under No Messages. The no-messages case did not occur under Costless 
Messages, where every pair in Period 1 had at least one message, so we omit this condition from the model. 
21 
 
type of communication was possible, in a manner consistent with our predictions. 
 Figure 4 explores whether responsiveness to messages in the two Reasonably Costly 
message conditions varies across periods. The graphs show the frequency of action 2 choices 
across periods, following either receiving (thin solid line) or not receiving (thick solid line) a 
message. The graphs also show the frequency of message “2.” In both conditions, subjects are 
slightly more likely to select action 2 when they receive a message of “2” from their opponent 
than when they do not, but the frequencies in both cases are quite high. The graphs also reveal 
little change in behavior over time. 
 
D. Variation Across Time - Learning 
 One might worry that our appeal to forward induction as the principal explanation for the 
central tendency in our data relies on an undue faith in the subjects’ introspective abilities.  This 
would be especially true if we observed that the modal behavior of efficient play without 
messages only arose after repeated play. Subjects might, for example, initially use messages to 
coordinate on action 2 and then learn to sustain this outcome while dispensing with the use of 
messages. While this concern is plausible, the evidence suggests that it is unfounded. 
 First, in the treatments where messages are available and at most reasonably costly, we 
see no significant trends in the use of message 2. This is evident in Figure 4 and in the fact that 
the coefficient on period (and on period interacted with treatment) in model 2 of Table 4 is small 
and statistically insignificant.  
Second, in the treatments where messages are available and at most reasonably costly, 
Figure 2 indicates that the frequency of action 2 is essentially constant over time. Notice that in 
model 2 of Table 5 the coefficient on Period representing the baseline No Message treatment is -
0.046 and that the coefficient on Period X RC-10 representing the effect in RC-10 relative to the 
No Message baseline is 0.049. The net effect of 0.049 – 0.046 is not significantly different from 
zero. Similarly, the sum of coefficients on Period and on Period X RC-100 is close to zero. This 
is in sharp contrast to the treatments where messages are either unavailable (no messages) or 
prohibitively costly (UC-300), where we see significant declines in the frequency of action 2.15 
Thus, while there is clear evidence for learning without messages or with unreasonably costly 
                                                
15 The coefficient on Period X UC-300 is negative and significant indicating that the decrease over time in the 
frequency of choices of action 2 is more pronounced in the UC-300 treatment than in the baseline No Messages 
treatment. 
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messages, learning appears to play little or no role in determining action choices when messages 
are reasonably costly. 
Third, as indicated in Figure 4, there is essentially no change over time in the frequency 
of action 2 conditional on receiving no message and hardly any change in the frequency of action 
2 in response to receiving message 2.  
Fourth, both the impact on the frequency of action 2 choices of making reasonably costly 
messages available and the fact that typically these messages are not used are already observed 
in period 1, as indicated in models 4 and 5 of Table 5. Note that when we pool the data from 
treatments RC-10 and RC-100 (which are not theoretically distinguished by the GW-FI analysis) 
the coefficient on the treatment effect in model 5, which uses only first period data and in which 
no messages were sent, is positive and significant at the 5% level (p=0.024). Thus, the effect is 
present from the first period on. 
As one might expect, the forward induction prediction does not account for all behavior 
either in the first period or in subsequent periods. In a small but persistent fraction of 
observations subjects send messages in the RC-10 and RC-100 treatments. There is also some 
churning, with some subjects moving from forgoing messages in one period to sending messages 
in the next period and vice versa. For example, of the RC-10 (RC-100) subjects who achieved 
the efficient equilibrium in the first period, 26 (37) again sent no message in period 2 and 6 (5) 
sent message 2. Conversely, of the RC-10 (RC-100) subjects who achieved the efficient 
equilibrium in the second period, 11 (16) already got there tacitly in the first period, 7 (6) got 
there with one message and 2 (0) with two messages. Figure 1 shows that in the treatments with 
reasonably costly messages churning is confined to a subset of subjects; the modal behavior is to 
never send a message. Thus, while there may be individual instances of subjects learning to 
forgo messages, the modal pattern of behavior is established from the first period on and does 
not emerge over time as a result of learning. 
 
E. Heterogeneity Across Sessions 
 Most of our prior analysis aggregates behavior across sessions, which may hide between-
session heterogeneity. We present, in Figure 5, results from the individual sessions for each 
condition. The horizontal axis indicates the frequency of message “2” in a session, while the 
vertical axis indicates the frequency of action 2. The gridlines divide the graph into quadrants, 
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three of which correspond to predicted message and action frequencies from our hypotheses (see 
Table 3):16 low message frequency and high action 2 frequency under Reasonably Costly 
messages (H1), high message frequency and high action 2 frequency under Costless Messages 
(H2), low message frequency and low action 2 frequency under Unreasonably Costly (H3) or No 
Messages (H4). With few exceptions the sessions within a particular condition lie in the 
appropriate quadrant – the exceptions are: one RC-10 session had slightly more than 0.5 message 
frequency (0.51), one RC-100 session had a low action 2 frequency (0.35), and one session with 
No Messages obtained a high frequency of action 2 (0.85, see footnote 9). But the remaining 22 
sessions all lie in the appropriate quadrant, providing strong support for our predictions. All but 
two (of 14) sessions with Reasonably Costly messages had both message frequencies below 0.44 
and action 2 frequencies above 0.56, and five sessions in these conditions had both message 
frequencies below 0.04 and action 2 frequencies above 0.90 (these are the sessions clustered 
towards the top left of the graph). Meanwhile, no session with Unreasonably Costly messages 
obtained an action 2 frequency greater than 0.3. Thus, while there is some heterogeneity at the 
session level, the behavior in a large majority of sessions generally conforms to our predictions. 
 
V. Discussion and Relation to the Literature 
We present novel experimental results on the role of communication in resolving tension 
between risk and efficiency in strategic interactions. Our central observation is that access to pre-
play communication favors efficient play in stag-hunt games even if communication is optional 
and moderately costly.17 Surprisingly, agents tend to achieve the efficient outcome without 
exercising their communication option. This behavior can be rationalized using forward 
induction, as defined by Govindan and Wilson (2009). 
                                                
16 To account for possible noise in the data, our hypotheses stated predictions in terms of modal behavior. More 
precise predictions correspond to the corner in each quadrant where message and action frequencies are either 0 or 1. 
17 Two recent experimental papers explore different kinds of costly pre-play communication in coordination games. 
Manzini, Sadrieh and Vriend (2009) consider pre-play communication unrelated to game strategies – i.e., “smiles” 
that players can send to one another prior to playing the game. The use of smiles, though infrequent, slightly 
increases the frequency with which players select higher (more efficient) strategies, but this does not translate into 
better coordination because of the infrequency with which subjects use smiles and the small effect of messages. A 
treatment with costly smiles yields significantly reduced use of these messages (less than 1 percent of cases result in 
both players smiling), though the ambiguous benefit of costless smiles make it difficult to predict what should 
happen when costs are introduced. Fehr (2011) finds that players infrequently vote to impose a costly 
communication regime on all players, prior to merging two three-person groups playing a coordination game, 
resulting in coordination failure. This research suggests that people fail to properly anticipate the benefit of costly 
pre-play messages. This contrasts with our result from the two-player game in this paper, which suggests that 
players choose not to send messages because they are unnecessary when costly. 
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 Much of the experimental literature on strategic risk-efficiency tradeoffs has focused on 
2-player, 2-action stag-hunt games and their multi-player multi-action relatives, weak-link games 
(Bryant 1983).18 For the stag-hunt game without communication, a stylized fact that emerges 
from the literature is that the risk-dominant outcome (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) tends to be 
selected (Cooper et al., 1990 & 1992). Similarly, in weak-link games there is a strong tendency 
for efficient play to unravel in favor of players choosing secure strategies (Van Huyck et al., 
1990). Our experiment provides further evidence for the selection of the risk-dominant outcome 
in stag-hunt games without communication, replicating the no-communication results of Cooper 
et al. (1990 & 1992). 
A number of theoretical papers have put forward the case for pre-play communication 
with cheap-talk messages playing a role in equilibrium selection, including Farrell (1988), Kim 
and Sobel (1995), Farrell and Rabin (1996), Blume (1998) and Demichelis and Weibull (2008).19 
The evidence from the experimental literature suggests that mandatory universal pre-play 
communication with cheap-talk messages favors Pareto efficiency in stag-hunt games (Cooper et 
al., 1990 & 1992) and weak-link games (Blume and Ortmann, 2007). Our experimental results 
show that universal cheap talk continues to promote efficient play in stag-hunt games, even if 
message exchange is voluntary. Furthermore, when such voluntary messages are costless, they 
are regularly used. 
 Optional pre-play communication with costly messages has been addressed in the 
theoretical literature on money-burning games. Ben-Porath and Dekel (1992) made the 
remarkable observation that if a single player is given the opportunity to burn money prior to a 
game he may be able to induce his favorite equilibrium without having to exercise this option. 
Specifically, they show that that this is the unique outcome that remains after iterative deletion of 
weakly dominated strategies. Their result does not extend to multi-sided money-burning games. 
Hurkens (1996), however, shows that an analogous result does hold in this case if one uses Basu 
                                                
18 Weak-link game have been experimentally studied by for example Van Huyck et al. (1990), Weber et al. (2001), 
Weber (2006) and Brandts and Cooper (2006), and represent useful models of varied economic activity, such as 
investment or production under complementarities (Bryant, 1983; Hirschleifer, 1983; Knez and Camerer, 1994).  
19 For theoretical analyses of the effectiveness of unilateral vs. multilateral communication, see Ellingsen and 
Östling (2010). In experiments, Cooper et al (1992) find that two-sided communication is more efficiency enhancing 
than one-sided communication. Weber et al. (2001) and Chaudhuri et al. (2009) find varying effectiveness of limited 
forms of communication. Other experimental evidence provides instances in which one-way communication yields 
high levels of efficiency (Charness, 2000; Duffy and Feltovich, 2002; Brandts and Cooper, 2007) or even out-
performs two-way communication (Burton et al., 2005). 
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and Weibull’s (1991) minimal curb condition as the solution concept. We show that for the stag-
hunt game studied by Cooper et al. (1992), among the pure-strategy equilibrium outcomes, 
forward induction as defined by Govindan and Wilson (2009) selects the one where efficiency is 
achieved without communication. 
 Forward induction captures the intuition that players make inferences about others’ future 
behavior from their past behavior based on their rationality. The terminology was introduced by 
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986, p. 1029) who associated it with the following property of stable 
sets of equilibria: “A stable set contains a stable set of any game obtained by deletion of a 
strategy which is an inferior response in all the equilibria of the set.” Van Damme (1989) 
provides an alternative definition of forward induction based on the extensive form of the game. 
Pearce’s (1984) extensive-form rationalizability expresses the forward-induction implications of 
assuming rationality and common belief of rationality (Battgalli and Siniscalchi, 2002). 
Govindan and Wilson (2002) explicitly define forward induction in the tradition of Kohlberg and 
Mertens. For our experimental data, extensive-form rationalizability and the closely related 
iterative admissibility condition correctly predict that strictly dominated strategies will not be 
used but fail to narrow down the prediction to efficient play without message use. This tendency 
in our data toward playing efficiently while forgoing the use of costly messages is predicted by 
applying the forward-induction definition of Govindan and Wilson to the pure-strategy 
equilibrium outcomes of our game. 
 The prior experimental evidence on money-burning games and forward induction is 
mixed. Huck and Mueller (2005) study one-sided money-burning games and find support for the 
Ben-Porath and Dekel prediction when games are represented in extensive form, but not for the 
corresponding representation in strategic form. Brandts and Holt (1995) find support for forward 
induction predictions only in simple games, where forward induction is equivalent to elimination 
of dominated strategies. Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross (CDFR) (1994) find partial support 
for the forward-induction hypothesis in the battle of the sexes with an outside option. It is indeed 
the case that players benefit from having an outside option, but it is also true that the outside 
option is frequently chosen when the forward induction solution says that it should not be. 
While Van Huyck et al. (1993) find support for forward induction in experiments on auctioning 
the right to play median effort games, Cachon and Camerer’s (1996) results suggest that some of 
this may be due instead to loss avoidance. Blume and Gneezy (2010) find evidence for 
26 
 
“cognitive forward induction”; players who find it difficult to coordinate on a non-obvious focal 
point in a coordination game achieve better outcomes when they are conscripted into playing the 
game by someone who had an attractive outside option. On the other hand, similar to CDFR 
(1994), Blume and Gneezy find excessive use of the outside option. To the best of our 
knowledge, the results of the present paper are the first to lend (qualified) support to the forward-
induction hypothesis in two-sided money burning games. 
 We also checked plausible alternative explanations for our experimental results, 
including level-k reasoning (Ellingsen and Östling, 2010) and quantal response equilibrium 
(McKelvey, R., and Palfrey, T., 1995; Anderson, S., Goeree, J., and Holt, C., 2001), and find that 
these cannot account for our results.20 We can also rule out that subjects are simply selecting the 
efficient equilibrium, as there is no tendency toward efficient play when either messages are 
unavailable or are available but unreasonably costly. The fact that the results are clearly different 
between reasonably and unreasonably costly messages – subjects generally do not use messages 
in either case, but coordinate efficiently in the former but not in the latter – supports our 
argument that, consistent with forward induction, it is the inference subjects draw from unsent 
messages that is critical for our main result. 
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Table 3: Experimental Conditions 
 
Communication Condition Message Cost (in ECU) 
Prediction 
(message “2”, action) 
Costless Messages c = 0 message, action 2 (H2) 
Reasonably Costly Messages (RC-10) c = 10 
no message, action 2 (H1) 
Reasonably Costly Messages (RC-100) c = 100 
Unreasonably Costly Messages (UC-300) c = 300 no message, action 1 (H3) 
No Messages - action 1 (H4) 
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Table 4: Random-effects Probit Regressions of Message “2” Use 
 
 
Dependent variable: Subject sent message “2” 
 
All periods Period 1 
(1) (2) (3) 
Reasonably Costly Messages (RC-10) -4.384
*** 
(0.404) 
-4.410*** 
(0.440) 
-1.372*** 
(0.313) 
Reasonably Costly Messages (RC-100) -5.165
*** 
(0.400) 
-5.218*** 
(0.438) 
-2.035*** 
(0.329) 
Unreasonably Costly Messages (UC-300) -5.891
*** 
(0.419) 
-5.777*** 
(0.464) 
-3.021*** 
(0.491) 
Period  0.006 (0.008)  
Period X Reasonably Costly Messages (RC-10)  0.001 (0.009)  
Period X Reasonably Costly Messages (RC-100)  0.002 (0.009)  
Period X Unreasonably Costly Messages (UC-300)  -0.006 (0.010)  
Constant 2.771
*** 
(0.323) 
2.662*** 
(0.361) 
0.967*** 
(0.272) 
    
Observations 8800 8800 220 
Number of subjects 220 220 220 
Log Likelihood -1884.94 -1880.18 -92.13 
 
All models include data from all conditions with messages; models 1 and 2 include subject random effects 
Standard errors in parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01  
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Table 5: Probit Regressions of Action Choice 2 in Stag-Hunt Subgame 
 
Dependent variable: 
Subject chose action 2 
All periods Period 1 Period 1 & no messages 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Costless Messages 2.346
*** 
(0.390) 
2.115*** 
(0.450) 
0.746 
(0.453) 
1.198*** 
(0.387)  
Reasonably Costly 
Messages (RC-10) 
2.132*** 
(0.328) 
1.261*** 
(0.368) 
1.997*** 
(0.367) 
0.708** 
(0.284) 
0.590* 
(0.345) 
Reasonably Costly 
Messages (RC-100) 
1.735*** 
(0.327) 
0.649* 
(0.366) 
1.602*** 
(0.320) 
0.758*** 
(0.286) 
0.664** 
(0.310) 
Unreasonably Costly 
Messages (UC-300) 
-0.353 
(0.341) 
-0.003 
(0.383) 
-0.480 
(0.381) 
0.067 
(0.290) 
0.136 
(0.295) 
Period  -0.046
*** 
(0.005)    
Period X Costless 
Messages  
0.020** 
(0.008)    
Period X RC-10  0.049
*** 
(0.006)    
Period X RC-100  0.059
*** 
(0.006)    
Period X UC-300  -0.023
*** 
(0.007)    
Received Message “2” 
(Costless Messages)   
2.366*** 
(0.198)   
Received Message “2”  
X RC-10   
-0.848*** 
(0.233)   
Received Message “2”  
X RC-100   
-0.173 
(0.250)   
Received Message “2”  
X UC-300   
-0.745*** 
(0.249)   
Constant -0.415 (0.272) 
0.456 
(0.308) 
-0.435 
(0.304) 
0.084 
(0.229) 
0.084 
(0.229) 
Observations 10000 10000 10000 250 148 
Number of subjects 250 250 250 250 148 
Log Likelihood -3500.49 -3233.64 -3096.57 -136.18 -91.24 
Models 1 through 4 include data from all conditions; model 5 omits Costless Messages; models 1 through 3 include 
subject random effects. 
Standard errors in parentheses; * - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01  
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Figure 1: Distribution of Individual Frequency of Message Use by Condition 
  
 
 
Figure 2: Action Choice over Time 
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Figure 3: Choices Conditional on (Message Sent, Message Received) 
 
 
Figure 4: Choices Conditional on Message Received over Time 
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Figure 5: Message and Action Frequencies by Session 
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Appendix: Instructions (RC-10 Condition) 
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